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Abstract. What can we discover? As the discussion in this paper is limited to 
ontological considerations, it does not deal with the discovery of new 
concepts. It raises the following question: What are the entities or existents 
that we can discover? There are two kinds of such entities: (1) actual entities 
and (2) possible entities, which are pure possibilities. The paper explains why 
the first kind of discovery depends primarily on the second kind. The paper 
illustrates the discoveries of individual pure possibilities by presenting 
examples such as the Higgs particle, Dirac’s positron, and Pauli-Fermi’s 
neutrino.    
 
 
1. Some examples of two kinds of discoveries 
 
The Standard Model, which is the model that physicists assume to describe correctly 
all the sub-atomic particles and forces working in nature, is strongly associated with 
some predictions and fascinating discoveries. Of particular interest are the sub-atomic 
particles W and Z, which are the weak force carriers, and the Higgs boson, the sub-
atomic particle that is assumed to endow sub-atomic particles with mass. From now 
on, I will simply mention “particles” instead of “sub-atomic particles.”  
The 2004 Wolf Prize in physics was awarded to Robert Brout, François 
Englert, and Peter Higgs “for pioneering work that has led to the insight of mass 
generation … in the world of sub-atomic particles.”1 This has been considered as an 
                                                
1
 See the site of the Wolf Foundation (2004). For clear and precise representations of 
the theory concerning the Higgs boson, consult Gross (2009) and Shears et al. (2006). 
On 8 October 2013, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced its decision 
to award the Nobel Prize in Physics for 2013 to François Englert and Peter W. Higgs 
“for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our understanding of 
the origin of mass of subatomic particles, and which recently was confirmed through 
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outstanding discovery, and the Wolf  Foundation’s announcement further states: “The 
discovery of Brout, Englert and Higgs was essential to the proof … that the theory 
with massive gauge particles is well defined; and subsequent calculations in that 
theory, verified experimentally, culminating in the discovery of the massive W and Z 
particles.”  
The particles called “gauge bosons” are the carriers of the fundamental forces 
of nature. Massive particles are those that have mass. Not all sub-particles have mass: 
photons, the light-particles, for instance, are massless. In contrast, all material 
particles must have mass. They gain their mass owing to an interaction with the Higgs 
boson. Without the Higgs particle, physicists are incapable of explaining why 
particles have mass. Thus, in the discovery of that particle hangs the fate of the whole 
of the Standard Model.  
 Two, quite different, kinds of discovery are mentioned in the Wolf 
Foundation’s announcement as cited above: (1) the discovery of the Higgs particle 
and (2) the discovery of actual particles, W and Z, the carriers of the weak nuclear 
force, as they were verified experimentally and their masses were measured (in 1983 
at CERN). Discovery (2) depended on discovery (1), for it is the Higgs particle that 
should endow W and Z with mass. We can easily understand what a discovery of an 
actual particle or entity is. Nevertheless, such was not the case of the Higgs particle 
until July 20122: until then this boson was not discovered or detected as an actual 
                                                                                                                                       
the discovery of the predicted fundamental particle, by the ATLAS and CMS 
experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider” (italics added). 
 
2
  The CERN press release of 4 July 2012 announces: “… the ATLAS and CMS 
experiments presented their latest preliminary results in the search for the long sought 
Higgs particle. Both experiments observe a new particle in the mass region around 
125-126 GeV.” See the CERN site at 
http://press.web.cern.ch/press/PressReleases/Releases2012/PR17.12E.html. 
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particle (though in 2011 there were already some tentative empirical signs of its actual 
existence).  
 Before 1983, the status of W and Z particles was similar to that of the Higgs 
boson before July 2012—namely, they were not known then as actual entities, 
namely, as actualities. As expected, the CERN site defined particles, prior to their 
discovery as actual entities, as “predicted” or “hypothetical and novel” (CERN 1983). 
As this paper is an ontological account and for reasons that will be explained below, I 
suggest replacing “predicted particles” and “hypothetical and novel particles,” which 
are quasi-epistemological terms, with “possible entities or existents,” which are modal 
terms that fit well my ontological account. As I will suggest below, these possible 
entities are real as much as actual entities are, though differently. 
Another illuminating example of the two kinds of discovery is that of the 
positron, the first discovered antiparticle. In 1928, Paul Dirac discovered it (namely, 
inferred its existence) on purely theoretical grounds, whereas Carl Anderson 
discovered the actual positron in experiments performed in 1932. Dirac referred to 
this particle as a positively charged electron, whereas Anderson named it “positron.” 
Dirac’s Nobel Lecture clearly shows how his notable equation opened up the 
possibility for the existence of a positively charged electron, which “one can infer” 
(Dirac 1933, p. 321) and which “appears not to correspond to anything known 
experimentally” (ibid., p. 323). Dirac characterized his discovery as an “inference” 
(ibid., p. 321) or “prediction” (ibid., p. 323).3 Still, he was awarded the Noble prize 
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 Mark Steiner argues that this is a modern kind of prediction: “Prediction today, 
particularly in fundamental physics, refers to the assumption that a phenomenon 
which is mathematically possible exists in reality—or can be realized physically” 
(Steiner 2002, pp. 161–162). Such a non-deductive, “Pythagoreanized” kind of 
prediction is of the kind according to which “possible implies actual” (ibid., p. 162), 
and “[in] the case of Dirac’s prediction, then, to predict the positron took courage or 
faith in mathematics. And the equation which supported this Pythagorean prediction 
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“for the discovery of new productive forms of atomic theory.” On grounds of such 
theoretical considerations Dirac also predicted the following: “It is probable that 
negative protons can exist, since as far as the theory is yet definite, there is a complete 
and perfect symmetry between positive and negative electric charges, and if this 
symmetry is really fundamental in nature, it must be possible to reverse the charge on 
any kind of particle” (ibid., pp. 324–325; my italics. A. G.). It is a prediction of other 
antiparticles, whose possibilities the theory necessitates or infers.  
In his Nobel Lecture in 1936, Carl Anderson, the discoverer of the actual 
positron, stated: “The present electron theory of Dirac provides a means of describing 
many of the phenomena governing the production and annihilation of positrons” 
(Anderson 1936, p. 368). In this case, too, the second kind of discovery, that of the 
actual positron, depends on the first kind, which is Dirac’s discovery of the possibility 
of a positively charged electron. Before Dirac’s discovery of this possibility, such an 
electron had to be considered as impossibility. It was not until Anderson’s discovery 
of actual positrons that scientists changed their attitude toward this possibility and did 
not ignore or exclude it any more.4 
The story of the discovery of the neutrino is even more fascinating. In a 
famous letter of 4 December 1930, Wolfgang Pauli reported that he had “hit upon a 
desperate remedy for rescuing” the compatibility of the law of the conservation of 
                                                                                                                                       
… was ‘derived’ by purely formalist maneuvers” (ibid.). As the reader will see, the 
metaphysical view on which this paper is based sees this discovery differently—to 
begin with, the possible does not imply the actual; instead, the actual depends on the 
possible, which thus conditions the actual. 
4
 For examples of the ignoring and misinterpreting of positron tracks before 
Anderson’s discovery, see Segrè 1980 (2007), pp. 191–193. On the grounds of the 
dependence of the discovery of an actuality on that of its possibility, it is reasonable to 
assume that had those experimentalists paid enough attention to Dirac’s discovery, 
which was about the possible existence of the positron, they could have, even before 
Anderson’s discovery, correctly interpreted their findings instead of misidentifying 
them.   
Two Kinds of Discovery 5
energy with the statistically empirical data concerning beta decay. The remedy was 
“the possibility [Möglichkeit] that there might exist … electrically neutral particles, 
which I wish to call neutrons” (Pauli 1994, p. 198; my italics, A. G.). In October 
1933, Enrico Fermi reported on his hypothesis and theory concerning the beta decay 
and the existence of the neutrino (because two years after Pauli’s discovery, James 
Chadwick discovered the neutron, Fermi suggested another name for the new possible 
particle—“neutrino,” namely, “the little neutral one”). The experiments performed by 
Frederick Reines and Clyde Cowan in 1953 and 1955 detected an actual neutrino 
directly and, thus, their work “verifies the neutrino hypothesis suggested by Pauli and 
incorporated in a quantitative theory of beta decay by Fermi” (Cowan et al. 1956, p. 
103). In this case, we encounter, to begin with, a discovery of a possibility, then a 
quantitative theory that establishes it by calculations and, finally, the discovery of the 
actual particle (which is not the end of the story, for there were some later discoveries 
concerning neutrinos, and at present the standard model comprises three kinds of 
them). Again, the whole story begins with the discovery of a possibility5 on which the 
discovery of the actual particle depends. From now on, I will call it “Pauli-Fermi’s 
neutrino possibility,” although it was Pauli who referred to the neutrino as a 
possibility (according to Fermi, too); Fermi, on the other hand, referred to it as a 
hypothetical particle (or “the hypothesis of the existence of the neutrino”), awaiting 
an experimental confirmation.6 Yet when mentioning Pauli’s idea, Fermi refers to the 
                                                
5
  Yet according to Reines, Pauli termed it also as a “postulate”: “Pauli put his 
concern succinctly during a visit to Caltech when he remarked: ‘I have done a terrible 
thing. I have postulated a particle that cannot be detected’” (Reines 1995, p. 204).  I 
consider Möglichkeit in Pauli’s letter as a preferable version, for it is a direct and 
authentic statement.  
 
6
 Pauli expressed doubts as to the actual existence of the discovered particle. Hence he 
wrote in his letter of December 4, 1930: “I admit that my remedy may perhaps appear 
unlikely from the start, since one probably would long ago have seen the neutrons if 
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admitting of the existence of the neutrino as “a qualitative possibility” which squares 
facts concerning beta decay with the principle of the conservation of energy (Fermi 
1933, p. 491). Unlike Dirac’s discovery, Pauli’s was of a qualitative possibility, 
namely it was independent of mathematical calculations and relied only upon 
theoretically physical considerations; whereas Fermi added the quantitative aspects to 
the discovered new possibility.   
Bearing in mind these examples of discoveries, it is not clear at all, at least 
philosophically, what is the nature of the discoveries by theorists such as Dirac, Pauli, 
Fermi, Brout, Englert, and Higgs, which were not discoveries of actual entities or 
facts. Experimentalists discovered the relevant actual entities years later, whereas in 
the case of the Higgs boson until quite recently there was no decisive evidence of its 
actual existence. It emerges that the aforementioned theorists discovered some new 
possibilities. But what is the nature of these possibilities and what is the connection 
between them and actual reality? Are they merely possible entities? Or, were these not 
entities at all? And, if not entities or facts, what did these theorists really discover? Or, 
perhaps, were they not discoveries at all but inventions? Perhaps, then, these theorists 
simply invented, created, envisaged, or stipulated hypotheses, conjectures, or 
predictions? Or, after all, perhaps they discovered some entities, existents, or facts, 
unknown as actual at the time of those discoveries? If so, what kind of entities, 
existents, or facts did they really discover? 
                                                                                                                                       
they existed” (Pauli 1994, p. 198). Having consulted Hans Geiger and Lise Meitner, 
he was more encouraged: “from the experimental point of view my new particles 
were quite possible” (ibid., p. 199). In contrast, the possibility of detecting such a 
particle was excluded by distinguished scientists such as Bethe and Peierls in 1934 
(ibid.). Moreover, Niels Bohr pointed out in 1930 that no evidence “either empirical 
or theoretical … existed that supported the conservation of energy in this case. He 
[Bohr] was, in fact, willing to entertain the possibility that energy conservation must 
be abandoned in the nuclear realm” (ibid., p. 203). It is a typical way of abandoning or 
even excluding possibilities that would be discovered later as indispensable for 
scientific progress. 
Two Kinds of Discovery 7
My account in this paper is mainly ontological. Thus, the discovery of 
concepts or ideas is not my present concern. Any discovery has to be of something, of 
some existent or entity. Indeed, concepts can be considered as discovered mental 
entities, but the discoveries I would like to discuss are of entities that are independent 
of our mind, whereas mental entities or concepts undoubtedly depend on our mind. 
Discoveries about ourselves, in the service of our self-knowledge and of knowledge in 
general—in philosophy, in psychoanalysis, and in other fields—are most valuable, but 
they are not my concern in this paper. 
 
2. Creation or invention 
Although the Higgs boson was not discovered as an actual particle until July 2012, as 
a possible entity it was neither a creation nor an invention. Brout, Englert, and 
Higgs’s theoretical considerations and mathematical calculations implied the 
discovery of a new particle that the Standard Model had lacked. Thus, the Higgs 
boson has completed the description of the behavior of all sub-atomic particles and 
fundamental forces in nature. This comprehensive description should correspond to 
reality or nature existing independently of the theory. As taking a necessary part in 
such a description, the Higgs boson cannot be considered as an invention; it is a 
discovery. Neither Dirac’s positively charged electron nor Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino 
possibility were creations or inventions. They were, however, possibilities whose 
discovery led to the discoveries of actual particles. Similarly, scientists expected that 
the discovery of the Higgs boson as a possibility would lead to the discovery of the 
actual particle (namely, that this particle would be experimentally detected or 
empirically observed). 
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Creation or invention is quite different from discovery. Creation or invention 
produces its objects, which are entities that did not exist before, whereas discovery is 
of quite a different nature: it concerns what existed before, independently of the 
discoverer, as the discoverer does not create his or her discovery. In contrast, the 
products of creation or invention necessarily depend on the creator or inventor (in 
many of the cases, on the individual creator) and they could not exist without him or 
her, whereas the existence of the discovered entities or facts is independent of the 
discoverer in general and of any individual discoverer in particular. In the natural 
sciences and in mathematics, we can find some examples of several independent 
discoverers of the same discovery (the abovementioned example of Brout, Englert, 
and Higgs’s discovery illustrates this perfectly).  
 
3. Conjectures, hypotheses, or predictions 
 
Conjectures, hypotheses, or predictions may be quite common and helpful in 
scientific discoveries. Major philosophers of science have devoted much thought to 
the contribution of conjectures and hypotheses to scientific knowledge (following 
Popper 1968). No less weighty appears to be the contribution of predictions to the 
discoveries of actual entities or facts. 
Nevertheless, conjectures, hypotheses, and predictions are merely means to 
discover some entities or facts. The aim is the discovery, whereas the means to attain 
this end may be conjectures, hypotheses, or predictions. These are epistemological 
terms, whereas discovery is an ontological one. My question is: What kind of entities, 
existents, or facts did the abovementioned theorists discover? The answer should be in 
ontological terms, not in epistemological ones. Thus, their discoveries were not of a 
“hypothesized, conjectured, or predicted entities,” which is a dubious hybrid of 
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epistemological and ontological term (or a quasi-epistemological term). On these 
grounds, the Higgs boson, as a possible entity, was not a hypothesized, conjectured, or 
predicted entity; it was a discovered entity, participating indispensably in the Standard 
Model which describes mathematically the behavior of all sub-atomic particles and 
fundamental forces in nature. Similarly, by means of his equation, Dirac discovered a 
new particle—a positively charged electron. Such discoveries make predictions 
possible. 
 Although it is accepted to characterize the theory that makes it possible to 
understand and explain the origin of mass—first introduced by Peter Higgs (in 1963) 
and, independently, by Englert and Brout (in 1964)—as hypothetical in respect of the 
Higgs field as well as the Higgs boson,7 I would like to attempt to characterize it 
differently. Both the Higgs field and the Higgs boson have been discovered entities or 
existents, though until quite recently they were not known as actual. As the Higgs 
field possibly permeates the whole universe, it is a discovered possible fact about the 
whole universe. Instead of “hypothesized facts,” I prefer to use “possible facts.” 
Equally, Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility should be considered as a possible entity. 
It was a discovered entity, not simply a hypothesis or conjecture, even though Fermi 
described it as hypothetical.  
 As I will argue below, possibilities can be legitimately considered as possible 
existents or facts for which ontological terms are valid and which are independent of 
the mind. Hence, possibilities are discoverable. 
Because the aforementioned theorists had discovered possible entities, 
existents, or facts, they could predict the actual existence of such entities. Yet the 
prediction is not the discovery. It follows the discovery of the relevant possibility 
                                                
7
  For instance, Shears et al. 2006, p. 3397. 
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which precedes and conditions the discovery of the actuality in question. In any case, 
prediction is an epistemological term, not an ontological one. 
 
4. Fictions and thought-experiments 
Imagination plays a crucial role in constructing models which have contributed much 
to the making of discoveries. Model constructing may also employ fictions. Thought-
experiments have been found quite useful for some major scientific discoveries,8 and 
thought-experiments may consist of fictions. Such fictions, actually truthful fictions, 
serve us quite well in discovering real possibilities without which some of our most 
striking discoveries, if not all of them, could not be made.9 The same holds true for 
the fictions involved in scientific models. These fictions are indispensable in serving 
scientists to make discoveries possible. We, thus, reach the same conclusion—
imagination and fictions may serve scientists in achieving discoveries, both in 
theoretical and empirical or actual domains, but there is a major difference between 
these means and the discovered facts or entities, actual or possible.  
 
5. Conventions 
 
Is the discovery of possible entities simply a matter of convention? There were 
conventions about some alleged entities, for instance, phlogiston (in chemistry) and 
ether (in physics), and as soon as the conventions were discarded, no scientist  
believed any longer in the existence, possible or actual, of such entities.  
                                                
8
  For instance, Szilard’s discovery of the nuclear chain reaction, Rowland and 
Molina’s discovery of the loss of the atmospheric ozone layer, and Mullis’s discovery 
of the polymerase chain reaction (Hargittai 2011, pp. 244–245, 200, and 218–221).  
 
9
  Regarding the vital role that truthful fictions play in discovering real possibilities, 
consult Gilead (2009). 
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Recently, Holger Lyre has raised doubt as to the reality of the Higgs 
mechanism as follows: “How is it then possible to instantiate a mechanism, let alone a 
dynamics of mass generation, in the breaking of … a kind of symmetry” which “is in 
fact a non-empirical or merely conventional one” and which does not possess any real 
instantiation, namely, realization in the world?10 Entities that, to our knowledge, have 
no instantiations or realization, namely, actualization, in empirical reality are, in 
Lyre’s view, mere conventions. Hence he assumes, wrongly, that non-empirical 
entities, which are possible entities, are, as a matter of fact, merely conventions. 
According to such a view, if the symmetries involved in the theory of the Higgs 
mechanism are about such entities, there is no real discovery involved, and it is 
simply a convention that so far physicists have accepted with no philosophical or 
otherwise critical grounds. This assumption is wrong, for the discovery of possible 
entities, which at the time of the discovery were not then known as actual (or for their 
actual existence there was no empirical evidence), can be quite real from a 
philosophical or scientific point of view, as I will argue, and it may be free of any 
convention or independent of it. Such is the lesson that I learn from the examples of 
Dirac’s possible positron and Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility. Furthermore, in 
many cases, as in these two examples, such discoveries challenge the accepted views 
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 Lyre 2008, p. 121. Lyre follows John Earman’s skepticism that gauge or gauge 
symmetry is simply a “descriptive fluff,” whereas philosophers of science should ask, 
“What is the objective … structure of the world corresponding to the gauge theory 
presented in the Higgs mechanism?” (Earman 2004, p. 1239). Likewise, Lyre 
emphasizes that the symmetry in discussion is “a merely conventional symmetry 
requirement” (Lyre 2008, p. 121). Thus, he reached the conclusion: “no ontological 
picture of the Higgs mechanism seems tenable, the possibility of an as-yet-
undiscovered process or a mechanism … notwithstanding. But … the Higgs 
mechanism ‘does not exist’” (ibid., p. 128). According to Lyre, the “possible 
existence of the as-yet-undetected Higgs boson … is a purely empirical question” 
(ibid., p. 130). The possible existence of the Higgs boson has not been an empirical 
question at all; however, its actual existence was such a question. It appears that Lyre 
assumes that actual or empirical facts are the only existing facts subject to discovery. 
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or conventions. Time will tell about the fate of the Higgs boson. Yet I see no reason 
why its discovery as a possible particle, a discovery made independently by different 
scientists, would be considered as a convention at all. 
 
6. Stipulation 
 
Discovery and stipulation exclude one another.11 The existence of the Higgs boson is 
not a stipulation; it is a discovery, whether of a possible entity or of an actual one. If 
the latter, it was discovered by means of the powerful Large Hadron Collider (LHC) 
at CERN. Similarly, the discovery of the possibility of a positively charged electron 
was not a stipulation that Dirac’s equation required; it was, however, a discovery of a 
real possibility which was inferred by means of a theory in general and an equation in 
particular. The same holds for Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility. It was undoubtedly 
discovered, not stipulated. When one stipulates, one does not mean to discover 
something or to put it to empirical test. 
 
7. Epistemic aids and the discovered existents 
 
Hypothesis, conjecture, prediction, fiction, thought-experiments, and the like all 
pertain to the epistemic aids for the discovery and should be discussed in the 
epistemology of discoveries. Yet the discoveries are not of these aids, the discoveries 
are of some existents, which are independent of these aids. It is impossible to discover 
something that does not exist, and it is meaningless to state that “one discovered 
something that does not exist,” unless we would like to say that it was not a discovery 
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 Hence, Saul Kripke claims: “‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by 
powerful telescopes” (Kripke 1980, p. 44). Cf. “Generally, things aren’t ‘found out’ 
about counterfactual situation, they are stipulated” (ibid., p. 49). Contrary to Kripke, I 
think that individual pure possibilities are discovered, whereas fictions about them are 
possibly stipulated or invented. 
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at all but simply an illusion or fiction. “Existence” has at least two meanings, only one 
of which is actual.  
Existents pertain to the ontic realm, which is philosophically investigated in 
light of ontological considerations. It is clear that the Higgs boson has been a purely 
physical existent of a special kind; until quite recently, it was not known as an actual 
existent. An actual existent is spatiotemporally and causally conditioned and it is 
empirically, directly or indirectly, observable or detectable. Until quite recently, there 
was no empirical evidence of the actual existence of this boson, though the Standard 
Model necessitates its existence—unless the Higgs boson existed, there was no 
explanation for the mass that each body or material entity must have. If no empirical 
evidence for the actual existence of this boson were found, this would have been 
pulled the ground from under the empirical validity of the Standard Model as a whole. 
Hence, there is an inseparable, necessary connection between the existence of the 
Higgs boson and the validity of the Standard Model as a whole. Similarly, there is a 
necessary connection between Dirac’s equation and the existence of a positively 
charged electron, which is a discovered possible existent, and the positron, which is 
an actual particle; just as there is a necessary connection between Pauli’s neutrino 
possibility, Fermi’s theory concerning it, and the discovery of the actual neutrino.12 
The Higgs boson (as a possible particle), Dirac’s positively charged electron, and 
Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility are discovered possible existents. What is the 
nature of such discovered possible existents? Are they similar to pure mathematical 
entities and the facts about them?  
                                                
12
 In a similar vein, it is quite interesting to realize that Pauli wrote in a letter to Niels 
Bohr on February 15, 1955: “Einstein said to me last winter, … ‘Observation cannot 
create an element of reality like a position, there must be something contained in the 
complete description of physical reality which corresponds to the possibility of 
observing a position, already before the observation has been actually made’” (Pauli 
1994, p. 43; the italics are in the original). 
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There is a difference between pure mathematical entities and natural scientific 
possible entities such as the Higgs boson. Such possible entities or existents, unlike 
purely mathematical ones, are useless or insignificant in case that they have 
eventually no empirical or actual validity. Still, both kinds of existents, as we shall 
see, share something ontologically essential.  
 
8. Calculation and measurement 
 
Possible entities are not subject to measurement but to calculation, whereas actual 
entities—actualities— are subject to measurement, for, unlike possible entities, 
actualities are subject to empirical observation, spatiotemporal location, and causality. 
For instance, a point in Euclidean geometry cannot be measured, whereas a dot, an 
actual point, is measurable. In the Standard Model there are twenty-six parameters, 
describing the strength of forces, particle masses and so on, which “must be measured 
experimentally and then added to the model” (Shears et al. 2006, p. 3396). While the 
mass of some particles is very accurately predicted by calculating the binding energy 
of their constituents, until quite recently there was no corresponding theory which 
could predict the mass of the fundamental particles themselves and that of the Higgs 
boson itself (Shears et al. 2006, p. 3396). This has to wait for the experimental 
observations and measurements which are and will be performed at CERN. The 
masses of fundamental particles are ascribed to the existence of the Higgs boson. This 
actual existence is waiting for more empirical evidence which hopefully will also be 
achieved at CERN.  
Calculations are a priori accessible and are primarily and directly valid for 
possible entities (such as the Higgs boson or a positively charged electron), to begin 
with, whereas measurements are only a posteriori accessible and are valid exclusively 
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for actualities. Furthermore, calculations (such as Dirac’s equation or Fermi’s theory 
concerning beta decay and the neutrino) are associated with the necessity about the 
calculated facts (which are possible facts) and with the necessary relations among 
possible entities, whereas measurements have to do with actual entities and facts, 
which can be considered contingent (there is more about this below). Until quite 
recently, the predictions concerning the Higgs boson were based upon the correction 
of the calculations of the Standard Model, not upon measurements.  
 
9. Abstract or ideal entities 
 
Are possible entities or existents, such as geometrical entities and the facts about 
them, abstract or ideal entities? Although this is an accepted view about such entities, 
I consider it as wrong.  
 The received view is that geometricians in particular and mathematicians in 
general abstract from actual drawings of geometrical figures some ideal entities—“a 
circle,” “a point,” or “a line,” for instance. By means of such abstractions they can 
make mathematical discoveries. In contrast, it is possible, following Kant or not, to 
show that mathematical discoveries are entirely independent of actual reality and 
empirical knowledge.13  
                                                
13
 Giaquinto 2007, Ch. 4, “Geometrical Discoveries by Visualizing,” shows how it is 
possible to make geometrical discoveries by visual means in a non-empirical manner. 
He thus relies on Kant in assuming synthetic a priori judgments in geometry (ibid., p. 
50). Giaquinto’s study is clearly epistemological, whereas I focus on the ontological 
aspects of discoveries. However, referring to Giaquinto’s study, Daniel G. Campos 
discusses a similar view hold by Charles Peirce, for whom “reality is not 
circumscribed to what actually exists. ‘Existing’ and ‘being possible’ both are modes 
of ‘being real’” (Campos 2009, p. 154). Campos relies at this point on Kerr-Lawson 
(1997). Kerr-Lawson, in turn, assumes that “no mathematical entities are existences in 
the fullest sense” (ibid., p. 79), as they are “hypothetical objects,” and he somewhat 
connect this view with that of Putnam concerning “mathematics without foundations” 
(ibid., p. 84). In my view, in contrast, the entities that pure mathematics discovers, 
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Unlike its representation or image as an actual dot, a point, for instance, has a 
position but no dimensions (according to the first definition in Book I of Euclid’s 
Elements); it cannot be measured and yet it exists “in” the Euclidean space, namely it 
is subject to an a priori order. A line (according to the second definition in that book) 
is a “length without breadth,” whereas any actual drawn line must have some breadth, 
however small. Actual drawn circles, lines, or dots are subject to our observation, 
whereas pure circles, lines, and points are not; only their manifestations, depictions, 
phenomena, images, or representations in actual space are. Pure geometrical entities 
are thus “ideal,” but this does not necessarily make them abstractions from actual 
reality. Neither are they idealizations of empirical facts, for if they were, they should 
be idealized according to some ideal standards or paradigms which, in turn, must be 
entirely independent of empirical facts and observation. 
 Actual drawn mathematical entities are actualities or depictions of purely 
possible mathematical entities. To identify actual mathematical entities we must rely 
upon such possible mathematical entities. Thus, to identify a dot as an actuality of a 
point we first must have access to the point as a possible entity. I argue this not on 
platonic grounds. I do not rely upon platonic paradigms or Ideas. I think about quite 
different entities, as I will explain below. 
 On such grounds, I do not consider mathematical entities as idealized 
abstractions from actual entities. Mathematical discoveries are, instead, of possible 
entities which are not idealized abstractions from actual ones but they precede 
anything actual.14 
                                                                                                                                       
albeit purely possible, are real as much as actual existents are and they are not 
hypothetical objects. Both kinds of entities or existents are subject to discovery. 
 
14
 Discussing mathematical discoveries, Gian-Carlo Rota relates to mathematical 
possibilities and proposes that “a rigorous version of the notion of possibility be 
Two Kinds of Discovery 17
 Mathematical proofs are necessarily valid for all possible relevant cases, 
whether actual or purely possible. Such cannot be the case of abstractions, however 
idealized, for abstractions first rely or, rather, are contingent, on some actual cases, 
from which they are abstracted, whereas the mathematical proof must be valid for 
every relevant possible case. Relying upon some actual cases, not upon all relevant 
possible cases, must make the case empirical and hence, contingent, and instead of a 
deductive proof we would rely only upon an inductive one. To assume that the 
inference and logics involved are a priori cognizable is not sufficient to substantiate 
the proof as universally valid, entirely independently of actual contingent cases, for 
logics is purely formal, whereas mathematics is different from formal logics, as it 
deals with contents and not with logical forms only. Hence, what makes pure 
mathematics exempt from actual constrains is not only its logical aspect; it is equally 
its purely mathematical aspect. 
 The discoveries of possible mathematical entities clearly show that they are 
primarily valid for possible facts that are associated with objective necessity, which 
cannot be ascribed to invention. That the sum of the angles of any Euclidean triangle 
is exactly 1800, for instance, concerns not only facts about any possible and actual 
Euclidean triangle; it also concerns the necessity about these facts. It is a necessary 
fact; there is nothing contingent about it. There is no Euclidean triangle that can be 
exempt from this fact. The mathematical discoverer must admit this necessity; he or 
                                                                                                                                       
added to the formal baggage of mathematics” (Rota 1997, p. 191). In Rota’s view, 
“[e]very theorem is a complex of hidden possibilities. … the proof of Fermat’s last 
theorem foreshadows an enormous wealth of possibilities” (ibid., p. 195); or “proofs 
of theorems of Ramsey type are an example of a possibility that is made evident by an 
existence [non-constructive] proof, even though such a possibility cannot be turned 
into actuality” (ibid., p. 185). The happy expression “open up new possibilities for 
mathematics” (ibid., p. 190) in its various forms (ibid., pp. 191, 192, and 195) is a 
valuable leitmotiv in Rota’s paper.  
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she is not entitled to free his or her mathematical way of thinking from it to invent any 
Euclidean triangle that is not subject to this necessity.  
 Purely mathematical entities are not purely physical entities. So what about 
our Higgs boson as a possible particle? Are my considerations about the existence of 
purely mathematical entities valid for possible (“purely theoretical”) particles such as 
the Higgs boson? After all, if alas, no empirical evidence of the actual existence of 
this boson had been found, this possible entity would have become useless or 
insignificant for physicists. Such cannot be the fate of purely mathematical 
discoveries. Nevertheless, like purely mathematical entities, the Higgs boson was not 
an idealized abstraction from any empirical data or actual facts. Dirac’s equation, 
Fermi’s theory of the beta decay, the Big Bang model, and the Standard Model are not 
such abstractions. Instead, they comprise discoveries of possible entities and their 
relationality (the general term concerns all the ways in which entities relate one to the 
other). The existence of these entities has been independent of actual physical reality 
and it conditions the discoveries of the actual facts for which the models are valid. 
The possible existence of the Higgs boson is a necessary condition for its discovery 
and identification as an actual entity, which must be left to actual reality and empirical 
evidence. The possible existence of Dirac’s positively charged electron was a 
necessary condition for its discovery and identification as an actual entity—the 
positron. It was Anderson who found the empirical evidence for the existence of the 
positron as an actual entity. The same holds for Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility and 
the discovery of actual neutrinos by Reines and Cowan. In each of these cases, the 
theorist’s discovery of the possible particle opens the way for the experimentalist’s 
discovery or detection of the relevant actual particle. 
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 My view concerning the discovery of possible entities rests neither on platonic 
nor on Kantian grounds. The way I consider possible entities, mathematical or purely 
physical, is quite different, for it rests upon the idea of individual pure (“mere”) 
possibilities and their necessary relations (in a general term—relationality).  
 
10. Possible existents as individual pure possibilities 
 
If possible existents are not idealized abstractions, then what are they? They are 
individual pure possibilities, which are real as much as actualities are, albeit 
differently. Regardless or independent of anything actual or of any actualization and 
exempt from any spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each individual possibility is 
pure. Individual pure possibilities are entirely independent of “possible worlds” as 
well as of any mind. The concepts of such possibilities are de dicto, but the 
possibilities themselves are possibilities de re.15 As possibilities de re, individual pure 
possibilities are entirely independent of any mind and any concepts, and thus they are 
discoverable by us. We discover new individual pure possibilities, which are different 
from other pure possibilities, with some of which we are already familiar, and from 
known actualities as well.  
To exist, any entity has first to be purely possible, to be a pure possibility. If 
an individual entity fails to exist as an individual pure possibility first, it cannot exist 
at all. Each existent, whether actual or not, has first to satisfy this ontological 
condition. Having this primary ontological condition satisfied and only then, the 
                                                
15
  Thus, I do not follow Nicholas Rescher’s conceptualism, replacing a “possibilism 
that is substantively oriented (de re)” by one that is “proportionately oriented (de 
dicto).” See Rescher (1999; 2003). For a critique of this powerful view see Gilead 
(2004). Nor I confine possibility to conceivability. There is much more to pure 
possibilities than conceivability, and the existence of individual pure possibilities does 
not depend on our mind.  
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secondary ontological condition as to what are the spatiotemporal and causal 
circumstances under which this entity can or cannot actually exist, may or can be 
satisfied. Hence, the existence of any individual entity, whether actual or not, depends 
primarily on the existence of its pure possibility. Individual pure possibilities are thus 
the most fundamental existents.  
No two pure possibilities can be identical—the law of the identity of the 
indiscernibles is necessarily valid for pure possibilities, which are exempt from 
spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions. In other words, no two 
possibilities can be only numerically different, whereas two allegedly identical 
actualities can be only numerically different, for they exist at different places in the 
same time or at the same place in different times. Such cannot be the case of pure 
possibilities, which are exempt from any spatiotemporal restrictions; hence, the law of 
the identity of the indiscernibles is necessarily valid for them. Any “two” “identical” 
pure possibilities are, thus, one and the same possibility, and each pure possibility is 
an identity, too—the identity of the actuality that actualizes this pure possibility. 
Hence, below I will use the expression “pure possibilities-identities.” With no access 
to the relevant pure possibilities-identities, scientists and laypersons alike may be 
doomed to be blind to the identity of phenomena or entities they may encounter. 16   
Because no two pure possibilities can be identical, each pure possibility is 
necessarily different from all the others. On this basis, each pure possibility 
                                                
16
  See, for instance, “We might marvel that Rutherford and Hahn did not grasp at the 
time the concept of isotopism, as they had discovered clear examples of isotopes; but 
when the mind is not prepared, the eye does not recognize” (Segrè 1980 [2007], p. 
58). This is a good example of the indispensability of the discovery of a pure 
possibility-identity for the discovery and identification of the relevant actual entity or 
fact. At that time, Rutherford and Hahn did not consider the possibility that one and 
the same chemical element could have been two different physical entities. At the 
time, this was considered to be impossible.   
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necessarily relates to all the others. As a result, the realm of pure possibilities shares a 
universal unifying or systematic relationality. 
In 1928, Dirac’s discovery of the positively charge electron was of a pure 
possibility-identity, which was a necessary condition for the discovery of the actual 
positron. The same holds for Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino pure possibility and the discovery 
of the actual neutrino.17 Dirac’s discovery of the pure possibility-identity of the 
positively charged electron and of those of other antiparticles predicted and paved the 
way to the discovery of the actual positron as well as other actual antiparticles. Until 
quite recently, the discovery of the Higgs boson was only the discovery of a pure 
possibility-identity. Without this fascinating discovery, physicists could not have 
predicted the actual existence of the Higgs boson, nor could they have explained how 
particles have mass, and how matter has been possible. As long as physicists had 
neither established evidence for the actual existence of the Higgs boson nor such 
evidence of its actual nonexistence, they still had well-established theoretical reasons 
to acknowledge its existence as a pure possibility. There appeared to be nothing to 
exclude it (despite some philosophical doubts). Thus, physicists thought that such a 
possibility must exist and should not be excluded; they knew a priori how to identify 
it; they understood and explained why it had to exist; they expected to discover its 
                                                
17
  Frederick Reines entitled his Nobel Lecture (for the detection of the neutrino) in 
December 1995—“The Neutrino: From Poltergeist to Particle.” In light of my view in 
this paper, I would like to rephrase this title thus: “The Neutrino: From Pure 
Possibility to Actual Particle.”  It is striking how both Pauli and Fermi were closely 
attached to Reines’s detection of the neutrino. It was with Fermi whom Reines took 
advice since 1951 about the “possibility of the neutrino detection” (Reines 1995, p. 
202; 206–208), and Pauli was the first to be informed by Reines’s telegram about the 
detection: “We are happy to inform you that we have definitely detected neutrinos 
from fission fragments by observing inverse beta decay of protons” (ibid., p. 214). 
Pauli responded: “Everything comes to him who knows how to wait” (ibid.). 
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actual existence; and, thus, they predicted this discovery.18 As a pure possibility-
identity, the Higgs boson has been a necessary existent, owing to the relationality 
within the scope of the Standard Model.19 This model necessitates the pure 
possibility-identity of the Higgs boson, and this necessity is independent of actual 
physical reality and empirical physical observations or experiments. In contrast, the 
physical utility and significance of this possibility depends, nevertheless, on actual 
physical reality and empirical observations or experiments, namely, on an empirical 
validity. The same holds true for the positron: the relationality of pure possibilities-
identities involved in Dirac’s theory and equation requires or necessitates the 
possibility of a positively charged electron regardless of actual reality and empirical 
observations or experiments.20 Similarly, Fermi’s theory and calculations about the 
beta decay and the neutrino necessitates Pauli-Fermi’s neutrino possibility. Given that 
conservation of energy is valid for the beta decay, this particle must exist! Though “if 
you didn’t see this particle in the predicted range then you have a very real problem” 
(Reines 1995, pp. 203–204). This reminds me very much of some quite recent 
thoughts about the Higgs boson.   
                                                
18
 As CERN Director General, Rolf Heuer, put it in July 2011, “We know everything 
about the Higgs boson except whether it exists.” 
 
19
  Although this model may have possible alternatives, the necessity under discussion 
holds true also, though differently, for the Higgs bosons in alternative models. 
Riccardo Barbieri, Lawrence J. Hall, and Vyacheslav S. Rychkov found it justified to 
consider possible alternative roads for physics beyond the Standard Model. See 
Riccardo Barbieri et al. (2006). For another possible alternative see T. Gregoire et al. 
(2004). Also consider Shears et al. 2006, pp. 3402–3403, for the Supersymmetry 
Model’s prediction of five kinds of Higgs boson as well as for other possible 
alternatives. 
 
20
 See Dirac 1928, p. 612. It was crucial that Dirac negated the attempt to exclude the 
very (pure) possibility of a positively charged electron. In this way, he opened up new 
possibilities for particles physics. On the way that excluding possibilities may result 
in blocking scientific progress and, in contrast, how saving possibilities contributes to 
this progress, see Gilead 1999. 
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 Contrary to Steiner’s interpretation (2002, p. 162), in Dirac’s case possibility 
does not imply actual; instead, the actual is an actualization of pure possibilities, 
existing independently of our mind (and likewise in the case of the neutrino). By 
means of our theories, mathematical or physical, we gain access to these possibilities. 
The necessity in discussion is not necessarily a deductive relationality; there are many 
kinds of pure possibilities, each is necessarily different from the others, and each 
necessarily relates to the others. Dirac’s discovery is about physical pure possibilities, 
which necessarily relate to one another and which are described mathematically. 
Mathematical description has been indispensable for any physical discovery since 
Galileo’s days until our own. Whether Dirac was a “Pythagorean” (in Steiner’s terms) 
or not, this does not necessarily reflect on his discovery of the positively charged 
electron, as long as we consider it as a pure possibility in the view that I present in 
this paper. 
 The relationality of mathematical pure possibilities in any mathematical proof 
is necessary, independent or regardless of any contingency and actuality or 
actualization. Unlike physically possible entities, the significance and strength of 
mathematical entities is independent of actual reality and empirical observations or 
experiments. Yet, physics, theoretical or applied, cannot exist without a strong 
reliance on mathematical language. Physics thus depends on mathematical pure 
possibilities and their necessary relationality. Pure mathematics and pure physical 
theory enable the discoveries of the pure possibilities-identities without which 
experimentalists cannot make the discoveries of the relevant actualities.  
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11. How is a priori accessibility to pure possibilities possible? 
Our intellect and imagination are good enough to allow us access, however limited (as 
we are limited beings), to the realm of pure possibilities. Pure possibilities are 
certainly different from actualities. Observing actualities, we always can free our 
thought from actual constraints and think about—discover—pure possibilities, which 
are different from them. Our imagination and intellect help us to do so in many 
occasions. For some reason or other, we pay more attention to our capability of 
abstraction, and we are inclined to forget that we can abstract because we can think 
about pure possibilities that are different from the actualities with which we are 
already familiar. Moreover, we can think about pure possibilities that are quite 
different from the pure possibilities with which we are already familiar. On these 
grounds, we are capable of discovering new pure possibilities. In other words, we 
have accessibility to new pure possibilities even though and because they are different 
from all the actualities as well as of all the pure possibilities with which we are 
already familiar. We do not need empirical observations and experiments to have 
access to new pure possibilities. We can thus rely upon our thinking, intellect, and 
imagination to gain such access, which is certainly good enough to put forward our 
mathematical and pure scientific theories. Our accessibility to the realm of pure 
possibilities relies upon the universal relationality of all pure possibilities as well as 
actualities, insofar as they are actualization of the relevant pure possibilities-identities. 
Every possibility, pure or actual, including the possibility of one’s mind, is different 
from the others and, hence, it relates to the others. This provides us with sufficient 
accessibility to the realm of pure possibilities, and this accessibility is a priori. 
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12. Panenmentalism 
In the last fifteen years, I have introduced and elaborated on an original systematic 
metaphysics of a special kind, entitled panenmentalism or panenpossibilism (Gilead, 
1999; 2003; 2009; and 2011). Until quite recently, I was not aware of the applications 
of this metaphysics to the discoveries discussed in this paper. Philosophy of science is 
one of the domains included in this systematically comprehensive metaphysics. This 
domain is the context in which this paper is embedded. Panenmentalism is a theory 
about individual pure possibilities and their universal relationality.  
Panenmentalism is entirely different from any kind of possibilism known to 
me and it opposes actualism. The philosophical view that does not admit individual 
pure (“mere”) possibilities altogether or at least as existing independently of actual 
reality—is called “actualism,” whereas the view that does acknowledge such 
possibilities I term “possibilism.” Actualism is generally allowed to use the idea of 
possible worlds and possible world semantics. 
To the best of my knowledge, no actualist theory, including the most recent 
ones, admits the aforementioned absolutely independent existence of individual pure 
possibilities or, more traditionally, even any existence of them (consult, for instance, 
Bennett 2005 and 2006; Nelson and Zalta 2009; Contessa 2010; Menzel 2011; 
Woodward 2011; Vetter 2011, and Stalnaker 2004 and 2012). 
 Challenging actualism, panenmentalism is a possibilism de re, according to 
which pure possibilities are individual existents, existing independently of actual 
reality, any possible-worlds conception, and any mind (hence, they are not ideal 
beings). To the best of my knowledge, panenmentalism differs from any other kind of 
possibilism. Claiming that, it is not in my intention to argue that it is preferable to the 
other kinds; I say only that it is a novel alternative to them.  
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The following are the main features in which panenmentalism differs from 
other kinds of possibilism: First, Panenmentalism is strongly realist about individual 
pure possibilities, which are thus independent existents rather than mere “beings” or 
“subsistents.” Over this point, panenmentalism disagrees with Meinonigians, Neo-
Meinonigians (to begin with Richard Routely [Sylvan]; see Gilead 2009, pp. 23–27, 
33–38, 46–47, 83–91, 109–113, and 121) and their followers (such as Graham Priest, 
Nicholas Griffin, Terence Parsons, and Edward Zalta). Second, it dispenses with the 
idea of possible worlds, which almost all the possibilists known to me have adopted. 
This idea is quite problematic for various reasons: for instance, it is not clear enough, 
and there are many controversies about it with no universal or long-standing consent; 
the problem of the epistemic accessibility from one world, especially from the actual 
world in which we live, to any other possible world does not appear to have a 
satisfactory solution; and if we can dispense with this idea and find a satisfactory, 
clearer and simpler, alternative to it, we should take this possibility into consideration. 
Third, panenmentalist pure possibilities are not abstract objects or entities, neither are 
they potentialities, for abstractions (as abstracted out of actualities or actual reality) 
and potentialities depend on actualities which are ontologically prior to them, whereas 
pure possibilities are ontologically prior to and entirely independent of actualities. 
Four, though using truthful fictions, panenmentalism, acknowledging the full, mind-
independent reality of pure possibilities, differs from any kind of fictionalism, 
especially modal fictionalism (Gilead 2009, pp. 80–83; this difference holds also for 
Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory). Five, as mind-independent, pure possibilities 
are not concepts, hence panenmentalism is possibilism de re and not conceptualism or 
possibilism de dicto.  
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If some readers may think that the panenmentalist pure possibilities allegedly 
remind them of Edward Zalta’s “possible objects” or “blueprints” (Zalta 1983; and 
McMichael and Zalta 1980) or of Nino Cocchiarella’s “possible objects” 
(Cocchiarella 2007, pp. 26–30; Freund and Cocchiarella 2008), such is not the case at 
all. First, these possible objects rely heavily on possible-worlds conceptions. Second, 
according to Cocchiarella’s conceptual realism, framed within the context of a 
naturalistic epistemology, abstract intensional objects “have a mode of being 
dependent upon the evolution of culture and consciousness” (Cocchiarella 2007, p. 
14), whereas panenmentalist pure possibilities are entirely independent of such 
evolution and of its naturalistic context as well and are a priori accessible. Third, 
following Meinonigians and Neo-Meinonigians, both Zalta and Cocchiarela consider 
“actual” and “exists” as synonyms, while, in their view, possible objects are merely 
“beings.” In contrast, panenmentalism treats both pure possibilities and actualities as 
existents, though in different senses of the term “existence” (distinguishing between 
the existence of pure possibilities and that of actualities—the former is 
spatiotemporally and causally conditioned, while the latter is entirely exempt from 
these conditions).  
Although David M. Armstrong adopts a special kind of possibilism (such as 
“possibilism in mathematics”) and is committed to mere possibilities, namely, 
those without instantiation (Armstrong 2010, pp. 89–90), this is not a possibilist view 
in my terms: in Armstrong’s view, these possibilities do not exist (ibid., p. 90), as he 
states that the only existence is spatiotemporal. Hence, his hypothesis is that there are 
no objects outside space-time (ibid., p. 5). Furthermore, though as a “one-worldler,” 
Armstrong rejects other possible worlds (ibid., p. 16), the mere possibilities that he 
adopts explicitly supervene on the actual (ibid., p. 68). Thus, they are not pure 
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possibilities in my terms (that is to say, entirely independent of anything actual). 
Finally, if mere possibilities are not existents, in what sense are they discoverable? 
Since Yagisawa’s modal realism heavily relies on the conception of merely 
possible worlds in which there are mere possibilia (Yagisawa 2010), I do not follow 
his view, either. The same holds for his distinction between “being” and “existence” 
or between “reality” and “existence.” With panenmentalism, all individual pure 
possibilities are full-fledged existents—not only “real” ones. As for the problem of 
transworld identity, it does not exist for panenmentalism, avoiding the idea of possible 
worlds altogether. 
With panenmentalism, pure possibilities are the possibilities-identities of 
actualities. Each actuality has a pure possibility-identity which cannot be shared with 
other actualities. This makes panenmentalism a unique kind of nominalism. Universal 
terms and laws rest upon the relationality of individual pure possibilities. Our 
accessibility to the realm of pure possibilities is a priori, whereas actualities are only 
a posteriori cognizable. Thus, our knowledge of actualities can be empirical only. 
Panenmentalism as a whole is thus neither empiricist, nor rationalist; yet it is 
rationalist about our knowledge of pure possibilities, and empiricist about our 
knowledge of actualities. 
 Necessity pertains to the existence of individual pure possibilities and to their 
relationality. Necessity also pertains to the inseparable connection between any pure 
possibility-identity and its actuality. There is no necessity at all about actualization. 
Thus, not all pure possibilities, albeit actualizable, are actualized, and the so-called 
“principle of plentitude” is not valid for actualities.21 The contingency about each 
                                                
21
  In contrast, Arthur Lovejoy’s famous principle—“Possible implies actual” (Steiner 
2002, p. 162) or “Any genuine possibility actualizes at some moment in an infinite 
time” (Bangu 2008, p. 249)— has been considered as inspiring the praxis of modern 
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actuality is strongly compatible with the a posteriori and empiricist nature of our 
knowledge of actualities. The necessity about pure possibilities and their relationality 
can be discovered by means of logical, mathematical, and other theoretical 
considerations (including truthful fictions), but the discovered possibilities and their 
relationality are entirely independent of these considerations or means. As for our 
knowledge concerning the actualization of such discoveries, it is entirely subject to 
empirical observations and experiments. 
 But, if all actualities are contingent, what is the point in predicting actual 
existents on the grounds of pure possibilities-identities and their relationality? The 
crucial point is that only on the basis of such predictions can scientists empirically 
recognize, identify, understand, and explain the predicted actual entities. The 
discovery of the actual positron, of the actual omega minus particle, of actual particles 
such as W and Z, of some predicted actual elements in light of the eka-elements in the 
Periodic Table, and many other discoveries of actual entities are fine examples of 
demonstrating this crucial point. The a priori acquaintance with pure possibilities-
identities made the discovery of the relevant actualities really possible. In contrast, 
excluding some possibilities on whatsoever grounds has hindered scientific progress 
(for instance, in the case of isotopes, the advent of quasicrystals [Gilead 2012] and 
others). 
 Pure possibilities are not ideal entities, which depend on our mind. We 
discover pure possibilities just as we discover actualities, though truthful fictions may 
help us greatly in discovering pure possibilities which are independent of our mind. 
                                                                                                                                       
physics.  For instance, Helge Kragh associates this principle, in its version as Gell-
Mann’s “totalitarian principle”—“Anything which is not prohibited [namely, 
possible] is compulsory”—with Dirac’s reasoning (Kragh 1990, p. 272). On the 
aforementioned panenmentalist grounds, I see Dirac’s discovery as well as the other 
discoveries discussed in this paper in quite a different light.  
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Thus, panenmentalism is not Kantian either. Pure possibilities and actualities are 
“things in themselves,” not phenomena. This does not render our knowledge absolute 
or exempt from failure; on the contrary, although our accessibility to the realm of pure 
possibilities is a priori, our knowledge of it is quite limited. We know quite a little 
about pure possibilities and even more so about their universal relationality. It is 
inevitable that we are also subject to mistakes and errors about existents, possible or 
actual. After all, on grounds of “lazy” or convenient conventions, received views, 
preconceptions and so on, we quite habitually exclude vital pure possibilities, which 
are indispensable for our discoveries and scientific knowledge, and thus hinder 
scientific progress and fail in our aiming at truths. Nevertheless, because my 
discussion in this paper focuses on ontological considerations about discoveries, I do 
not discuss these major epistemological problems in this occasion. 
Again, individual pure possibilities are not members of any possible world. 
Panenmentalism is exempt from possible-worlds semantic or metaphysics. As is well 
known, the idea of possible worlds has served actualists who have denied the 
existence of individual pure possibilities, which are entirely independent of actual 
reality in general and of actual individuals in particular. 
 
13. A Metaphysical Platform 
 
As all individual pure possibilities universally relate to each other, there is a 
metaphysical platform for embedding all there is in a universal system. On this 
platform, physical pure possibilities and their relationality also rest. The Standard 
Model reveals not only the symmetries that govern physical reality as a whole but also 
discovers how the breakings of these symmetries, which made it possible for particles 
to gain mass and to be material particles, are restored. Symmetry plays a crucial role 
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in modern physics, not for aesthetic reasons and not necessarily for mathematical 
reasons,22 I think, but because symmetry is a universal and unifying relationality of 
the multiplicity in nature under simple common law.23 Note that the classical function 
of symmetry has been of “harmonizing” the different entities into a unified whole; 
whereas the modern concept relies also on equal entities, but still the relationality 
among the entities, whether different or equal, is maintained.24 Panenmentalism bases 
the relationality of pure possibilities on their differences, as no two pure possibilities 
can be identical. 
 According the Standard Model, the massless photons can reach any point in 
the universe; they can spread themselves infinitely. Whenever the symmetry in the 
universe breaks, the omnipresent photons “mend” this and restore the symmetry. 
According to the panenmentalist metaphysical platform, photons thus actualize the 
basic universal relationality in the physical universe, for the photons communicate 
                                                
22
 Steiner argues that predictions by the use of symmetries “are of the (nonreductive) 
‘possible implies actual’ variety because symmetry conditions define more what 
cannot occur rather than what must occur” (Steiner 2002, p. 162). According to 
panenmentalism, in contrast, because any actuality is contingent, no scientific 
prediction can be about “necessary” actual existence. The necessary relationality of 
pure possibilities does not imply actual necessity, whereas the inseparable connection 
between any pure possibility-identity and its actuality is necessary, though there is no 
necessity about the existence of any actuality. Given these restrictions, well-
established predictions on grounds of symmetry may be very helpful scientifically, for 
instance, in the case of the discovery of the omega-minus particle. For an opposite 
view, questioning even the scientific status of such a prediction, which appears to be 
merely an educated guesswork, consult Sorin Bangu concerning the discovery of 
omega-minus (2008, pp. 256–257).   
 
23
 For this reason symmetry has occupied the attention of physicists until the present: 
for instance, Pierre Curie’s interest in crystals’ symmetry; classical crystallography 
and the quasicrystals; symmetry’s role in the special and general theory of relativity; 
in quantum mechanics; and in the Standard Model. One of the most illuminating 
insights of Pierre Curie was about the importance of symmetry in determining which 
phenomena are possible.  
 
24
  Cf. Brading and Castellani (2008). As for permutation symmetry, it is a moot point 
whether the law of the identity of the indiscernibles is valid for quantum physics 
(ibid.), whereas panenmentalism applies it to every individual pure possibility.  
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each distinct part of this universe to all the rest. The actualized relationality is the 
symmetry, apparent or hidden, that governs physical reality. We may say that the 
Standard Model thus discovers this symmetry in the two senses of discovery which 
this paper explicates:  (1) the discovery of the relationality among all the physical 
individual pure possibilities (of particles and forces) and (2) the discovery of this 
symmetry as an actual fact about physical reality. 
 
14. Two kinds of discovery 
In sum, there are two kinds of discovery: (1) discoveries of possible entities, which 
are individual pure possibilities-identities, and of their relationality; (2) discoveries of 
actualities. The second kind of discovery depends on the first kind. To discover new 
actualities we have to discover their pure possibilities-identities first or, at least, not to 
exclude these possibilities but to admit them, knowingly or unknowingly. One of the 
major hindrances in the path leading to scientific and other discoveries is our 
inclination to exclude possibilities from the outset. For instance, the discovery of 
quasicrystals was greatly hindered by the supposition that such crystalline structures 
were theoretically and empirically impossible. 
 Were the positron and other antiparticles not purely possible in the light of 
purely physical theory, all that we know today in physics could be entirely different 
and some major discoveries of some actual antiparticles would not be possible from 
the outset. The same holds true for the Pauli-Fermi neutrino possibility and the 
application of the principle of the conservation of energy on the subatomic reality. 
Were the Higgs field and the Higgs boson not purely possible from the outset, 
namely, in the light of the purely physical theory of the Standard Model, physicists 
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could not attempt to discover their actualities, and our understanding, explaining, and 
knowledge of the universe would have been much less than they are today.  
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